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Conceptual Metaphor Theory and Classical 
Theory: Affinities Rather than Divergences
Like the poets, ordinary people refine language by means of metaphors.
Johann Adam Hartung (1831)1
0. Introduction
Conceptual Metaphor Theory (CMT) by George Lakoff and his collaborators2 has 
proven to be a great success over recent decades. Its success is based upon a wide 
range of application in various fields. But a part of its attractiveness is that this 
theory, on the one hand breaks with previous classical theories of metaphor, on the 
other hand generalizes these theories for the major part of language. CMT makes 
strong claims against the so-called Classical Theory (CT) which has spanned the 
accounts of metaphors from Aristotle to Davidson.3 In the first and the second 
part of this essay, the main tenets of these competing theories will be presented. 
The main aim of this essay is, however, to show that, given all the differences, the 
core of CMT, the so-called Invariance Principle, is in significant respects similar to 
the main principles of several CTs.4 A mapping (i.e. an internal relation) is always 
expressed between two structures. These structural affinities will be examined in 
1 Taken from Jäkel (1997: 10). 
2 For sake of simplicity, I will refer to George Lakoff as the sole author of CMT, al-
though he has developed the theory with numerous collaborators like Mark Johnson, 
Mark Turner, Zoltán Kövecses and others.
3 CMT is not the only contemporary original approach that aims to bring new direc-
tions to the study of metaphor. Relevance Theory is the other major response to the 
traditional approaches to metaphor. See Sperber and Wilson (2008) for a general 
overview and Wilson (2011) for a comparison of Relevance Theory and CMT.
4 These similarities were observed early in J. P. Thorne’s review of Metaphors We Live 
By: “Lakoff and Johnson do not mention Black’s book, despite the fact that there are 
certain quite striking similarities between their ideas and his (notably the idea that 
‘The essence of metaphor is understanding and expressing one kind of thing in terms 
of another’. Not, notice, comparing one thing with another). It is difficult to believe 
that they do not know Black’s work but it is easy to understand why they should 
be anxious to avoid giving the impression that their work is in any way derivative” 
(1983: 246). This claim is, however, in sharp contrast to Black’s (1981) review of the 
same book which is altogether critical. It is striking that Black does not mention any 
similarities to his own account.
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the third part. In the fourth part, I will focus on the main difference between these 
theories which is the literal-metaphorical distinction. CMT claims that CT makes 
this distinction in a wrong way and this failure can be proven empirically. I will 
argue that the literal-metaphorical distinction marks out an a priori decision as to 
what the object of investigation is. As CT has it, most novel metaphorical utterances 
are usually trivially false. Having identified the set of metaphorical expressions in 
question, CT investigates the underlying mechanism. This investigation is, at least 
partly, of an empirical nature. By contrast, CMT stipulates a priori the metaphorical 
mechanism and then empirically investigates various realizations of this mechanism 
in language and other social practices. What we need in response to this divergence 
is a better classification of metaphors which will be provided in the fifth section of 
this essay. It appears that the mechanism of conceptual metaphor covers much of 
everyday language in the first place. CMT, thus, focusses primarily on conventional 
metaphors and struggles to extend its mechanism to novel metaphors, whereas CTs 
focus on novel metaphors and struggle to extend their mechanisms to conventional 
metaphors. In the final part of this essay, I will indicate that all these extensions are 
unsatisfactory. The main reason is that all these theories study metaphors from the 
synchronic point of view and they are unable to take into account any semantic 
change. They are unable to explain how a novel metaphor acquires a conventional 
meaning and thus becomes a part of our conceptual system, i.e. a conceptual meta-
phor. What we need is rather a diachronic perspective which would allow us to 
explain the role of metaphor in semantic change and the development of language 
in general.
1. Classical Theory
Let me start by figuring out the aspects of CT that CMT might be breaking with. 
Here are some characteristics of CT derived from Lakoff (1993):
(1) Ordinary language is conventional and all everyday conventional language is 
literal and none is metaphorical. CT is thus based on the literal-metaphorical 
distinction.
(2) Metaphor is defined as a novel or poetic expression used outside its conven-
tional realm of use to express other similar concept.
(3) Only literal language can be contingently true or false.
(4) All definitions given in a lexicon are literal, and not metaphorical.
As one would expect there is no single classical theory of metaphor, but rather 
theories that more or less meet these specifications. According to Lakoff (1993) 
and Johnson (2008), the major representatives of CT are Grice (1975), Searle (1979), 
Davidson (1978), and Rorty (1987). These are indeed the most significant theories 
of metaphor in analytic philosophy. I will add to this list the classical theories by 
Richards (1936) and especially those by Black (1955, 1979) who also wrote a highly 
critical review of Metaphors We Live By (Lakoff and Johnson, 1980). The question 
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now is: To what extent do these theories meet the specifications (1)–(4)? The answer 
is that they basically do, although with minor modifications. They are indeed based 
on the literal-metaphorical distinction. Ordinary language is, for the most part, 
conventional and literal. Metaphor is a novel or poetic expression. No metaphor 
is conventional. What metaphor accomplishes, however, is a matter of disagree-
ment. According to Richards, Black, Grice and Searle, it expresses another concept 
that is somehow related to the original concept. This relation does not need to be 
similarity, it can be an analogy, extension, narrowing, loosening or a subordinated 
metaphorical or metonymical transfer. According to Davidson and Rorty, metaphor 
does not express anything beyond its literal meaning. What it accomplishes is a 
perlocutionary effect that cannot be captured as a metaphorical meaning. Accord-
ingly, only Davidson and Rorty, but not Black, Grice and Searle would accept (3) 
that only literal language can be contingently true or false. The last claim is, I think, 
generally accepted among all these theories, for it follows on from (1) and (2).
Lakoff’s characterization of CT as endorsed in these analytic philosophers is 
basically correct. What is missing though in his description is the characteriza-
tion of a mechanism on which our understanding of metaphor is based. Here is 
an outline summarizing the theories by Richards and Black. In order to cope with 
the enormous complexity of natural languages, they restrict their investigation to 
subject-predicate sentences of the form “A is B”. The basic idea is that if such an 
utterance is intended or/and recognized as a metaphor then the literal meaning of 
“A” interacts with the literal meaning of “B” resulting into a metaphorical meaning 
of “B” which is hereby being predicated of “A”. So Richards: “Principle of metaphor: 
when we use a metaphor we have two thoughts5 of different things active together 
and supported by a single word, or phrase, whose meaning is a resultant of their 
interaction” (1936: 94, my emphasis).
Black’s main aim is basically an explicit characterization of these complexes and 
an explication of how two meanings can inter-act. They do indirectly through so-
called implication-complexes or associated implications. An implication-complex is a 
set of implications predicable to a term. An implication complex A is a set of implica-
tions in the form of ‘A implies Ai’ and an implication-complex B is a set of implica-
tions in the form ‘B implies Bi’. These implications do not need to be true. They only 
have to be considered to be true in a given context (they may consist of “common-
places” about the secondary implication complex B, background and encyclopedic 
knowledge, deviant or ad hoc implication induced by the author or by the context 
(Black 1955: 291)). The very interaction has processual and reciprocal character:
(a) the presence of the primary subject incites the hearer to select some of the second-
ary subject’s properties; and (b) invites him to construct a parallel implication-complex 
5 It is noteworthy to highlight that Richards calls the entities that are interacting 
thoughts. From the very same sentence it is clear that thoughts are meanings (of 
words). I will in the same vein interpret Lakoff’s use of the expression “thought”.
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that can fit the primary subject; and (c) reciprocally induces parallel changes in the 
secondary subject. (Black 1979: 29)
The core of the interaction consists of pairing members of these complexes [Ai,Bi]. 
The meaning Bi is transformed by a function fi so that it is predicable of A instead of 
B. The function fi may stand for an “(a) identity, (b) extension, typically ad hoc, (c) 
similarity, (d) analogy, or (e) what might be called a metaphorical coupling, (where, 
as often happens, the original metaphor implicates subordinated metaphors)” (Black 
1979: 31). In the final step, parallel changes are induced in the secondary subject. 
That is, some of the Ai implications are reversely transformed and predicated about 
B even though the surface grammatical form “A is B” does not make any commit-
ment that A ought to be predicated of B.
Let me illustrate this method with an example of Thomas Hobbes’ metaphor 
“Consequence is a train” (of thoughts).6 The implication-complexes, which depend 
on the context of utterance or reception, might be:7





Implications Implications Pairing Way of pairing







consequence is a link 
connecting thoughts
train is a link 
connecting places
[link, link], [places, 
thoughts]
identity
consequence is a 
causal connection





train is difficult to 
stop













6 “By ‘consequence’, or ‘train’, of thoughts I understand that succession of one thought 
to another which is called, to distinguish it from discourse in words, ‘mental dis-
course’.
 When a man thinketh on anything whatever, his next thought after is not altogether 
so casual as it seems to be. Not every thought to every thought succeeds indiffer-
ently” (Hobbes 2012: Ch. III, p. 11).
7 This table is taken from Kobíková and Mácha (2015) where a detailed interpretation 
is to be found.
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The outcome of the interaction might be the following properties predicated of the 
concept of logical consequence: A kind of causal connection connecting thoughts, 
which is difficult to avoid. This listing is open-ended; we are always able to add 
additional implications. Besides, there are subordinated metaphors “Logical laws 
are (like) timetables”, “Thoughts are places in space”. We can now recursively apply 
the same method onto these metaphors. Furthermore, train movements can be seen 
more like organic processes in human bodies, which are expressed, for example, in 
the biological metaphor “The Railway network is a nervous system” or when we 
speak about “backbone tracks”.8
The weak spot in this schema is how to determine which implications from this 
potentially endless list are included in the metaphorical meaning of the original 
metaphor. We can restate this point as a problem of commitment: To which impli-
cations is the speaker committed? Either they are committed to (1) all, or (2) some, 
or (3) none of them. The first option is quite implausible. We cannot take Hobbes 
to be committed to the claim that the railway network is a nervous system. There 
will always be implications that were not intended by the speaker as propositional 
content, but that will be only alluded with lower resonance (to be defined below). 
The other options seem to be more plausible. We can take Hobbes to be committed, 
for instance, to the implication that consequence is a kind of causal connection. But 
we can do so only because Hobbes stated this implication in the sentence follow-
ing the original metaphor. The implication is, thus, asserted in the context of the 
utterance, but not in the utterance itself. The question is how we can distinguish 
those implications that are asserted from those that are merely alluded or connoted. 
This distinction must be lexically encoded in the metaphor itself or in some of its 
lexical units. But then the metaphorical meaning would be given conventionally. 
This, however, contradicts the a priori definition of metaphor as a novel, i.e. non-
conventional use of language. 
We are at crossroads now. This is a serious objection which we can face in two 
ways: One can insist on the classical definition of metaphor, or one can abandon 
the classical definition. The former option, taken by Davidson and Rorty, leads to 
the conclusion that there is no metaphorical meaning. All these implications are 
only alluded to and the speaker is not committed to any of these. The latter option 
leads us to the conclusion that metaphor can be conventional. This is the way of 
Lakoff and his CMT. I would like to stress that this decision is one of whether to 
keep or to extend the definition of metaphor. It is a decision as to which theoretical 
terminology is preferable.
Is there, however, anything these that theories from Richards to Davidson have 
in common, that we can speak roughly of as a Classical Theory? All these classical 
theories share the literal-metaphorical distinction. All classical theories have it that 
in a metaphor, there is an expression used metaphorically (primary subject, focus, 
8 For a detailed overview of biological metaphors in the perception of railways, see 
an illuminating essay by R. Harrington (1999).
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tenor) and an expression used literally (secondary subject, frame, vehicle). The es-
sence of metaphor is that the primary subject is understood in terms of or seen as 
the secondary subject. In the metaphor “A is B” the concept A is seen/understood 
as the concept B.
I have argued in my book Mácha (2010) and elsewhere that in these analytic theo-
ries that which is essential in the metaphor “A is B” is an internal relation between 
the concept A and the concept B. This relation may be expressed as a metaphorical 
meaning (in Richards and Black), as a pragmatic inference (in Grice and Searle), as 
a perlocutionary, psychological or as a causal effect (in Davidson and Rorty). An 
internal relation is a relation between the structures of the concepts (i.e. the mean-
ings of the words) that are involved. In order to make and understand metaphors, 
we have to share an ability to construct metaphorical meanings/pragmatic infer-
ences/perlocutionary effects at once. That is the ability to find an internal relation 
between concepts used literary and concepts used metaphorically. These concepts 
are usually given conventionally and they may be further enriched from the context 
of the utterance and by a shared background knowledge and experience.
To anticipate things further, my claim is that Lakoff’s CMT makes this distinc-
tion between metaphorical and non-metaphorical language quite differently, but the 
mechanism of how metaphor works bears striking similarities to CT.
2. Conceptual Metaphor Theory
Let me now try to summarize the main tenets of CMT, or rather my understanding 
of them. It must be noted at the outset that I strip CMT from its cognitive science 
image (and its cognates like cognitive linguistic, neuro science etc.).9 It is my convic-
tion for which I cannot argue in detail here that to mantle a linguistic theory with 
a cognitive science terminology or to proclaim its alignment with cognitive science 
is often a rhetorical device that makes the theory appear more fashionable and up 
to date. The main claim Lakoff makes in this respect is that metaphors are a matter 
not only of language, but of thought in the first place. Metaphorical expressions in 
language are a manifestation of our thinking which is fundamentally metaphorical. 
Metaphor is not a mere stylistic or rhetorical figure, but “a major and indispensable 
part of our ordinary, conventional way of conceptualizing the world” (Lakoff 1993: 
204). I take this to mean that metaphors are not a stylistic feature of language, 
because some metaphors are indispensable for language and thinking. It is hard to 
imagine what the competing views are here. Are they ancient theories of metaphor 
such as found in Aristotle, Cicero or Quintilian? But only an uncharitable reading of 
these philosophers would yield the view that metaphors are a mere stylistic figure 
fully dispensable from language. The point is that none of the above mentioned 
9 Hereby I follow Read (2016), but this idea is hinted at in Max Black’s review of 
Metaphors We Live By: “their reiterated psychological or mentalistic emphasis, does 
no effective work” (1981: 209).
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analytic philosophers makes such a claim. They claim, in contrast, that metaphor 
is a matter of meaning, of concepts, and also, especially in Rorty, a matter of causal 
psychological processes. Moreover, if we look at Lakoff’s method, what he actually 
does, for the most part, is analyzing linguistic expressions and figuring out what 
they signify. His method is basically an analysis of linguistic meaning. A genuine 
reference to our thinking processes (jargon which includes “activations of neurons”, 
“brain centers”, “neural bindings”, “firings” etc.) came later, esp. in Lakoff (2008), but 
the main tenets of CMT have remained unchanged.10
CMT defines metaphor as a cross-domain mapping across conceptual domains: 
“The word metaphor has come to mean ‘a cross-domain mapping in the conceptual 
system’” (Lakoff 1993: 203). This is also Lakoff’s definition of metaphor (and, thus, 
it is not an empirical claim). It states that one domain of our experience can be un-
derstood in terms of another domain. In Metaphors We Live By (Lakoff and Johnson 
2003: 170), “domain” means just “kinds of things”. Later on CMT started to prefer 
the terms “mental space”11 and “cognitive domain” which should highlight the fact 
that metaphor is about thoughts, not just words. By stripping away the cog. sci. 
gown, we can take this to mean that one part of our language can be understood 
in terms of another part. A typical example is the metaphor LOVE IS A JOURNEY. 
Actually LOVE IS A JOURNEY is the name of a mapping between entities from the 
domain of journeys and entities from the domain of love:
Travelers are mapped onto lovers.
Vehicles are mapped onto love relationships.
A journey is mapped onto the events in a relationship.
Destinations of the journey are mapped onto the goals of the relationship.
Decisions about direction are mapped onto the choices about what to do.
This list of ontological correspondences between our conceptualization of journey 
and love is not exhaustive. It is important, however, that this mapping is an abstract 
structure (“cognitive structure” in Lakoff’s terms) that may be expressed in surface 
language in various ways, e.g., in
“Our relationship has hit a dead-end street.”
“We’re stuck.”
“Where does our relationship lead?”
etc. etc.
10 The view that even non-conceptual mental states like feelings and affections are 
genuinely metaphorical has some historical grounding in Herder (1772) and Ni-
etzsche (1873).
11 Fauconnier and Turner define mental spaces as “small conceptual packets construct-
ed as we think and talk, for the purposes of local understanding and action. They 
are very partial assemblies containing elements, structured by frames and cognitive 
models” (2002: 120).
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It is not necessary, for the existence of this conceptual metaphor, that the expression 
“Love is a journey” occurs in an actual utterance. It is a mere name of the map-
ping (and that is why it is capitalized) and also this mapping does not occur in any 
actual utterance as such, but is only realized through metaphorical expressions as 
indicated in the list.
If the core of this metaphor (i.e. this mapping) does not exist in language, where 
does it exist then? Lakoff’s answer is that metaphor is a matter of thought which 
is, one may presume, in the realm of concepts.12 This answer suggests however, 
that there are two distinct realms: the realm of language and the ream of thought. 
The former lies on the surface and can be investigated with the methods of clas-
sical linguistics. The latter, the realm of thought, is prima facie something deep, 
a deep structure which manifests itself in language. The realm of thought can be 
investigated directly by the methods of cognitive science (and, of course, indirectly 
through its manifestation in language). I would now like to oppose this line of 
argument. Linguistics and the philosophy of language do not study only language 
at its surface form (i.e. they are not restricted to syntax). They are inquiries into 
meaning, into what words actually signify. If the conceptual metaphor LOVE IS A 
JOURNEY maps vehicles to love relationships, this can be taken to mean that “ve-
hicle” (or “car”) can be substituted for “love relationship” in appropriate contexts. 
This means that the meaning of “vehicle” is identical (more or less) with the meaning 
of “love relationship”. It is a case of local synonymy, i.e. the identity of meanings 
that are restricted to a certain context (aka “domain”). The correspondence between 
“bachelor” and “unmarried man” is basically the same kind of mapping like the one 
between vehicles and love relationships. The only difference is that synonymy is 
less context sensitive (context dependent) than conceptual metaphor. If there is no 
need to postulate the deeper realm of thought for explaining synonymy, we do not 
need it for explaining conceptual metaphor either.
Metaphorical mappings are not arbitrary. There is a principle that determines 
the structure of these mappings. Lakoff calls it the Invariance Principle: “The image-
schema structure of the source domain is projected onto the target domain in a way 
that is consistent with the inherent target domain structure” (Lakoff 1993: 245). This 
principle consists of two main claims: Firstly, that metaphorical mapping is not an 
arbitrary set of separate correspondences. A cognitive structure of the source do-
main is preserved in the target domain. We can employ various devises to determine 
the cognitive structure of the domain: it can be an image-schema topology (interiors, 
exteriors, containers, paths, boundaries, trajectories etc.), we can use the device of 
12 Black (1981: 209) complains that Lakoff uses the term “concept” very loosely in the 
sense of an “idea” or “notion”. I would like to add that we can take “concept” to 
mean “meaning” without invoking any cog. sci. framework. Let us recall that in the 
quotation above Richards (1936) understands “thoughts” as being “meanings” that 
are supposed to interact in metaphor. 
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sematic frames13 in order to include background or encyclopedic knowledge into 
this structure (Sullivan 2006; Lakoff 2008: 34–37). Secondly, only those structures 
that are mapped onto the target domain are consistent with it. In other words, the 
structure of the target domain cannot be violated. This means, however, that the 
structure of the target domain remains always intact. A metaphor maps always the 
source domain onto the target domain, but not the other way around. Metaphorical 
mappings are thus asymmetrical and partial.
3.  The method of interaction and the invariance
principle in comparison
In this section I compare the mechanisms of CT and CMT which have been just 
introduced. First let us look at their resemblances. There are always two structures 
and a relation between them. The first of these two structures is called the “primary 
subject”, “primary system of associated commonplaces”, “primary implication com-
plex” (Black), the “target domain” (Lakoff), “blended mental space” (Fauconnier and 
Turner). The other structure is called the “secondary subject”, “secondary system 
of associated commonplaces”, “secondary implication complex”, “source domain”, 
“input/generic mental space”. Some of these structurers are conceived to be rather 
static (esp. in Lakoff), some primarily conventional (in Black), other highly fluid (in 
Fauconnier). By their construction, CT usually begins with the conventional con-
ceptual system which may be further enriched from the (linguistic as well as extra-
linguistic) context of the utterance and by a shared background knowledge (not 
necessarily true) and (possibly subjective) experience. On the other hand, CMT and 
other cognitive theories like Blending Theory begin with our experience which is 
primarily conceptual, though not restricted to language. To be sure, these structures 
are not identical. There are various aspects, various emphases and various grades 
of stability. But, by a charitable interpretation, the overall structure is the same.
Between these two structures there exists, or is constructed, a relation. The na-
ture and complexity of this relation differs across the theories in question, but we 
can find common ground there. At the bottom, elements of the source structure 
are mapped onto the target structure so that the topology of the source structure is 
preserved in the target structure. In other words, the mapping is an isomorphism – 
which may be partial, i.e. not every part of the source structure must be mapped 
onto the target structure. The invariance principle is valid also in CT. This principle 
says nothing more than that there is an internal relation between the two structures.
There is, however, disagreement over the dynamic character of this relation or 
this mapping. Lakoff claims that his mapping is static and conventional: “Conven-
tional mappings are static correspondences, and are not, in themselves, algorith-
mic in nature” (1993: 245). These mappings are “fixed correspondences that can 
13 Frames are “structured understandings of the way aspects of the world function” 
(Fauconnier and Sweetser 1996: 5).
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be activated, rather than algorithmic processes that take inputs and give outputs” 
(Lakoff 1993: 218). For Lakoff, the source and the target domain are static, and so 
is the mapping between them. Comprehending a conceptual metaphor is no more 
algorithmic than comprehending a non-metaphorical language. There is no ad-
ditional thought process in the case of metaphorical language. So, for instance, we 
understand the following instance of a conceptual metaphor “Our relationship is off 
the track” in the same way as the non-metaphorical statement “There is something 
wrong with our relationship”. there is no additional processing of the focal phrase 
“of the track”. There is some justification for this attitude. Lakoff’s main focus is on 
everyday language and why it is structured in this or that way. If conceptual meta-
phors structure everyday language, they cannot bring any additional processing (if 
they did however, they would not make up the core structure of everyday language). 
CT and also Blending Theory (which can be seen as a recent development of 
CMT) tend to see this mapping as algorithmic or dynamic in nature. In Black’s In-
teraction Theory, the implication complexes are constructed by selection, yet they 
are based on conventional knowledge. There, real dynamics come with the interac-
tion between these complexes. Their members are being paired and the nature of 
each particular pairing of two members may be different. As already mentioned, 
this may be identity, extension, similarity, analogy, or a subordinated metaphor. 
There may also occur different ways of pairing within a particular metaphor which 
may be “a ‘mixed lot’ of projective relations” (Black 1979: 31).14 Some of these pairs 
may again be figurative or metaphorical, in which case the method of construction 
of the interaction complexes and their interaction has to be executed recursively.
Searle’s (1979) theory of metaphor is another good example of the pragmatic and 
algorithmic character of understanding of metaphor. He considers the following 
general situation: In a metaphorical utterance, “A speaker says S is P but means 
metaphorically that S is R” (Searle 1979: 122). The metaphorical meaning R is arrived 
at by going through the literal meaning “S is P”. The relation between the literal and 
the metaphorical meaning is systematic. This fact implies that there must be some, 
at least implicit, principles that govern their relation. The main task of his theory is 
to state these principles. Searle adds that there is no single principle at work here. 
Among the main principles are:
“Things which are P are by definition R.”
“Things which are P are contingently R.”
“Things which are P are often said or believed to be R”
…
(Searle 1979: 116ff)
An example of the first principle is that “Sam is a giant.” which means “Sam is big.”. 
An example of the second principle is that “Sam is a pig.” meaning “Sam is filthy.”. 
14 That the metaphor “consequence is a train of thought” is also a mixed lot is indicated 
in the last column of the table above.
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And finally, an instance of the third principle is that “Sam is a gorilla.” means that 
“Sam is mean and nasty.”. We see that the literal meaning is always being trans-
formed, usually extended by picking up a salient property that is transferred onto 
a new domain. These principles are stated rather loosely (they are, in fact, indeter-
minate). But the same is also true of the principles of Black’s Interaction Theory. 
There is, therefore, not much disagreement. 
Something similar is going on in Blending Theory. First, there is established a 
mapping between a generic space and each of the input spaces which contains what 
the inputs have in common (Fauconnier and Turner 2002: 41). Then there emerges 
a cross-space mapping between the input spaces. Finally, there will be developed a 
blended space which is an “emergent structure that is not in the inputs” (Fauconnier 
and Turner 2002: 42). There is a three-step process of achieving this: composition 
(of the elements from the inputs), completion (bringing additional structure to the 
blend), and elaboration (running the blend, modifying it imaginatively). In addition 
to this, there is a backward projection, i.e., “anything fused in the blend projects back 
to the counterparts in the input spaces” (Fauconnier and Turner 2002: 44). Within 
Blending Theory, as similarly within Black’s Interaction Theory, the mapping is 
bidirectional, i.e. not only from source to target, but also from target to source. This 
stands in contrast to Lakoff’s version of CMT (cf. Mitchel 2015: 24).
The main point of agreement between CT and CMT is that they both assume an 
isomorphic mapping (or mappings) between two structures. These structures are 
usually given conventionally and possibly extended. The mapping is either given 
conventionally, or it emerges in the metaphorical processing. The final product may 
be a metaphorical meaning or a blend. 
4. The literal-metaphorical distinction
We can now turn to the literal-metaphorical15 distinction which presents the main 
point of disagreement between CMT and CT. Given the mechanism of cross-domain 
mappings outlined above one can ask where or in which parts of language this 
mechanism is at work. In other words, how can we recognize such expressions 
which are understood via cross-domain mappings (i.e., conceptual metaphors)? 
This is apparently an empirical question. Lakoff argues that almost all parts of our 
language are metaphorical. The only exception is the realm of concrete physical 
experience (Lakoff 1993: 205). It is interesting to look at the evidence that Lakoff 
brings forward to support this claim. The evidence he mentions is of the following 
types: Generalizations governing polysemy, inference patters, novel metaphorical 
language, patterns of semantic change and psycholinguistic experiments (Lakoff 
15 For the present discussion I will disregard the fact that metaphorical language is 
only one kind of figurative language. All points can be extended onto other figures 
like metonymy or irony.
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1993: 205). All of these types of evidence, except the last one, can be studied by the 
tools of classical linguistics with no need to invoke the cog. sci. framework.
CMT delimits the literal-metaphorical distinction differently than CT, and moreo-
ver Lakoff claims that this CT makes a false assumption in this respect (Lakoff 1993: 
204). But there is a great deal of conceptual confusion lurking here. For CT, the 
literal-metaphorical distinction is defined a priori, viz. as a novel use of language 
which shows a contextual abnormality (most metaphorical utterances are usually 
trivially false or otherwise contextually inappropriate). By this definition, CT delim-
its its scope of investigation. Having identified the set of metaphorical expressions in 
question, CT then investigates what the underlying semantic or pragmatic mecha-
nism is. This investigation is, at least partly, of an empirical nature. By, contrast CMT 
stipulates a priori the metaphorical mechanism, i.e. the cross-domain mappings, and 
then empirically investigates the various realizations of this mechanism in language 
and other social practices. It appears that the mechanism of conceptual metaphor 
covers not only poetic expressions, but also much of ordinary everyday language. 
There is, thus, apparent disagreement among these theories that stems from their 
different assumptions. Lakoff basically says that CT is wrong because its assump-
tion about the literal-metaphorical distinction is at odds with his empirical account 
of this distinction. But from the standpoint of CT we could raise the objection that 
CMT is wrong because it assumes a mechanism that is too broad, for it covers not 
only novel uses of language, but also a great portion of conventional language.16
Why to prefer the conceptual approach over the classical one which Lakoff 
terms the “Literal Meaning Theory”? In Lakoff’s understanding, the Literal Meaning 
Theory says that the major part of language is literal and metaphorical utterances 
are exceptional. Given the literal-metaphorical distinction from CT, this claim is true 
by definition. But given this distinction from CMT, this claim is empirically false. 
Hence, every argument against the Literal Meaning Theory that refers to some kind 
of empirical evidence misses the point.
Lakoff brings forward two objections against the Literal Meaning Theory: Be-
cause “conventional language and our conventional conceptual system are funda-
mentally and ineradicably metaphoric” (Lakoff and Turner 1989: 116), conventional 
language is not semantically autonomous (the so-called Autonomy Claim) and not 
capable of making reference to objective reality (the so-called Objectivist Claim), 
hence “the concept of ‘literal meaning’ as it has traditionally been used is not ap-
propriate to the discussion of real natural language” (Lakoff and Turner 1989: 116). 
But Lakoff’s argument is a straw man. CT makes no such assumption about the 
nature of conventional and ordinary language. Regardless of whether conventional 
language is not semantically autonomous, or whether is capable of making reference 
16 Black actually raises this objection when he says that Lakoff’s “stipulated equation 
of ‘metaphor’ with ‘metaphorical concept’ would either make nonsense of many of 
the things we normally want to say about metaphors, or would demand clumsy and 
unilluminating paraphrases” (Black 1981: 209).
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to objective reality or not, regardless of the precise meanings of these terms, the 
literal-metaphorical distinction within CT makes sense and we can study metaphors 
as novel uses of language.17
CMT’s main concern is, to be sure, everyday conventional language and how 
it is structured. Lakoff and his collaborators emphasize that within everyday lan-
guage there are certain regions (target domains) that are structured as other regions 
(source domains). The structural relations between these domains bear a striking 
similarity to the metaphorical relation in CT. Moreover, we can use such structural 
relations or mappings in comprehending certain (typically abstract) realms of ex-
perience. I consider this to be the main merit of CMT. There are, as indicated above, 
important dissimilarities between these relations. Within CT this relation is never 
conventional, while within CMT it is (almost always) conventional. Lakoff seems to 
accuse CT of taking literal language to be not metaphorical at all. This is, however, 
not quite true. CT admits that literal language is full of so-called dead metaphors. 
I do not want to equate dead metaphors within CT with conceptual metaphors 
within CMT, but they both aim to explain the same linguistic phenomena.
What needs to be explained – within CT as well as within CMT – is how these 
two phenomena hang together. CT needs to explain in which way the mechanism 
for explaining novel metaphors is active or present in conventional language – in 
other words, what dead metaphors have to do with novel metaphors. CMT needs 
explain how the mechanism of conceptual metaphors can be extended onto novel 
metaphors. We see at these formulations that for CT “metaphor” means primarily 
“novel metaphor” and for CMT “metaphor” means primarily “conceptual metaphor”. 
Before going back to the metaphorical mechanism, a synoptic classification of the 
different kinds of metaphors would be helpful.18 
5. Towards a better classification of metaphors
Many of the advocates of CT simply distinguish only between literal language and 
metaphorical language with the implicit presupposition that some parts of literal 
language are dead metaphors. This simplistic classification does not bring us further. 
Black provides a more detailed elaboration by distinguishing “extinct”, “dormant” 
and “active” metaphors (Black 1979: 26f). These classes are defined in terms of two 
characteristics: emphasis and resonance. Emphatic metaphors are not decorative or 
17 Johnson makes even a stronger claim against the Literal Meaning Theory: “The un-
derlying issue is whether ‘reality’ is objectively given, so that, as knowers, we can 
only stand apart and comment on it, or whether we have a ‘world’ only by virtue of 
having a language and system of value-laden concepts that make experience possible 
for us” (Johnson 1981: 78). Even though such a direct realism is endorsed in Searle, 
it is not a general view shared by all advocates of CT (like Black or Davidson).
18 Cf. Romero and Soria (2005: 3): “The terminological distinctions used by cognitive 
metaphor theorists are not the traditional ones; these theorists introduced a termi-
nological shift that should be clarified at avoid misunderstandings”.
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ornamental, they allow no variation upon the words used. Resonance means a de-
gree of implicative elaboration. The more resonant a metaphor is, the more implica-
tions are transferred into the metaphorical meaning. A metaphor is dead or extinct 
if only one single implication makes up its meaning which is then called the literal 
meaning. Other implications are only alluded to which is, very roughly, how literal 
language works. This single implication must be, then, determined conventionally, 
for literal meaning is – let us assume – determined this way. As we saw above 
when we were discussing Davidson’s objection to Black’s Interaction Theory, this 
convention is the only way of determining what is meant, literally or metaphori-
cally, as opposed to what is merely alluded. The classification of metaphors within 
CMT is more fine-grained:
(1) Firstly, there are non-metaphorical concepts which are related to our experiences 
with concrete physical objects (e.g., “The balloon went up.”).
(2) Secondly, there are marginal metaphorical concepts which are conceptual meta-
phor though, but they are “idiosyncratic, unsystematic, and isolated” (e.g., “a 
foot of a mountain”) (Lakoff and Johnson 2003: 56).
(3) Thirdly, there are literal conventional metaphors which are conceptual metaphors 
as described above.
The following species of metaphors go beyond the conventional system, they are 
labeled as “non-literal” or “imaginative”.
(4) The fourth class in made up by extensions of the used part of a literal metaphor 
(e.g., “These facts are the bricks and mortar of my theory.”).
(5) The fifth class are instances of the unused part of a literal metaphor (e.g., “His 
theory has thousands of little rooms and long, winding corridors.”).
(6) Sixthly and finally, there are novel metaphors which are not based on our con-
ventional conceptual system.
This classification and all the examples are taken from Metaphors We Live By. Later 
Lakoff came up with the notion of image metaphors.
(7) Image metaphors “map one conventional mental image onto another” (Lakoff 
1993: 229); the mapping itself is not conventional, but a “one-shot”. These meta-
phors do not involve conceptual domains, but rather structured mental images. 
Their aim is to create or adjust a rich image in the target domain (which is 
usually more abstract) rather than to create an inferential structure. So, for 
instance, when Kant says that understanding is the land of truth which is an 
island surrounded by an ocean of illusion, we are prompted to perform a map-
ping of the image of an island amid an ocean onto the target domain of our 
mind’s understanding and create an abstract image there.
Classes (1)–(3) cover those labeled by Black as “extinct” and “dormant”. Lakoff’s 
class of imaginative metaphors (4)–(7) correspond to Black’s “active” metaphors.
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6. Novel metaphors and open-endedness
To recap, CT is focused on novel metaphors. Most of its advocates provide only a 
rudimentary explanation how a novel metaphor stabilizes its meaning and becomes 
a part of conventional language, i.e. becomes a dead metaphor. We saw above that 
Black gives just such a sketchy account. In general, it would be difficult to provide 
a complete explanation of such a meaning change in a synchronic approach for 
the majority of CTs.
CMT proceeds the other way around. It is mainly focused on conventional lan-
guage and on conventional metaphors. CMT aims, however, at explaining novel 
metaphors as well, and moreover by using the same mechanism of domain map-
pings – or so are we told. Novel, or imaginative, metaphors are of the classes (4)–(7). 
Metaphors of type (4) and (5) are extensions of conventional metaphors. Lakoff 
points out indeed that “the older research on novel metaphor […] completely missed 
the major contribution played by the conventional system” (Lakoff 1993: 237). But, 
as we have seen, the conventional system plays an important role within CT. In 
Black’s Interaction Theory, the metaphorical meaning is the result of the interaction 
of two conventional meaning-complexes.
The question is still how can the conventional system produce novelty? The idea 
is the following one: The source domain is never fully isomorphic with the target 
domain. An isomorphic mapping between them is, thus, always partial. It may hap-
pen, then, that some conventional items from the source domain are mapped onto 
items from the target domain that are not conventional. What is conventional in 
the source domain does not need to be conventional in the target domain. A con-
ventional part of the source domain may be activated in the target domain in order 
to go beyond the conventional system and create novelty. Lakoff claims, on the one 
hand, that each mapping is “a fixed pattern of ontological correspondences” (Lakoff 
1993: 210), but it defines, on the other hand, “an open-ended class of potential cor-
respondences” (Lakoff 1993: 210). I see a tension between “fixed” and “open-ended”. 
For “open-ended” means that the mapping can always be extended. But then it 
cannot be fixed. It is therefore contentious whether extensions of conventional 
metaphors are really novel metaphors. They may be cases rather of what Black 
(1955: 280; 1979: 27) calls catachresis, i.e. the filling up a lacuna in our conceptual 
system.19 As long as the source domain and the mapping are fixed by convention, 
a projection of the source domain on the target domain will be fixed too. If this 
projection is not conventional, there is a lacuna in our conceptual system that can 
be filled up through the source domain and the mapping.
Let us turn now to metaphors of types (6) and (7). Novel metaphors are either 
outside of our conventional conceptual system or they map one conventional mental 
19 Black adds: “Catachresis is the putting of new senses into old words. But if a cat-
achresis serves a genuine need, the new sense introduced will quickly become part 
of the literal sense” (1955: 280).
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image onto another. Their distinctive feature is that they are typically “one-shot” 
mappings. In the case of image metaphors, these mental images are elicited by 
conventional language (like in the example from Kant). The source image is then 
mapped onto the target image preserving their structure. So the Invariance Principle 
applies to image metaphors as well. But it is not determined by the words used, 
but by convention by which part of the source image is mapped on part of the 
target image; furthermore it is not determined which aspect of the source image 
should be mapped, i.e. whether we should focus on shapes, or colors etc. The fact 
that the structure that is mapped is not determined makes image metaphors (and 
non-conceptual metaphors in general) truly open-ended. Only such metaphors are 
really novel metaphors which are the main focus of CT.
Lakoff claims further that image metaphors have to be activated. “The words 
prompt us to map from one conventional image to another”, they “are prompts for 
us to perform a conceptual mapping” (Lakoff 1993: 230). I would like to highlight 
that we are prompted to perform a mapping. Which mapping actually? There may 
be simultaneous mappings which “are very common in poetry” (Lakoff 1993: 219). 
There must be a reasoning as to which mappings are employed.20 A mapping (or 
mappings) is activated and performed. An open-ended set of correspondences is 
simply not there. Since the set of correspondences is potentially infinite, there must 
be a reasoning (on the side of the utterer as well as the recipient) which activates 
this or that correspondence. In conclusion, the open-endedness of novel metaphors 
and the possibility of simultaneous mappings calls into question the static character 
of conceptual domains and mappings within CMT.
CMT focuses primarily on conventional conceptual metaphors. Its mechanism of 
conceptual mappings is static and rigid, because all conventional language is static 
in this synchronic approach. As soon as the focus is extended into novel metaphors 
which are not conventional, the mechanism must be made more dynamic. This 
mechanism of dynamic conceptual mappings is very close to Black’s Interaction 
Theory. There are two sematic domains that are both being enriched by knowl-
edge about the subject matter. This enrichment is open-ended, which means that 
there is an inherent limitation to it. And finally, there is a mapping between these 
two domains which preserves their structure so that we can talk about a partial 
isomorphism. Neither the mapping nor the domains determine which entities are 
mapped and which are not. As opposed to conventional language, novel metaphors 
are imaginative precisely because no convention determines what structures are 
mapped and what are not.
20 Lakoff’s example of simultaneous mappings is Dylan Thomas’ line “Do not go gentle 
into that good night.” where “go” employs DEATH IS DEPARTURE, “gentle” employs 
LIFE IS A STRUGGLE and “night” employs A LIFETIME IS A DAY (Lakoff 1993: 219).
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7. Conclusion: a plea for a diachronic account
The main objective of this essay is to show that Lakoff’s CMT is not so different 
from CT if we clear up their terminological differences, primarily by getting rid of 
CMT’s cog. sci. jargon. If we focus on recent developments of CMT like Blending 
Theory, the affinities to CT are even more apparent. Seen in this light, Lakoff’s cri-
tique of CT is unsubstantiated and is rather a rhetorical self-image.21 Nevertheless, 
in my view CMT presents a major improvement over CT consisting of two aspects:
(1) Many theorists before Lakoff’s breakthrough in the early 1980s had noticed 
that our language is full of dead (or conventional in CMT’s terms) metaphors.22 But 
only Lakoff focused on metaphorical systems rather than just on isolated metaphors. 
Conventional metaphors are usually not “idiosyncratic, unsystematic, and isolated”, 
but rather systematic. He and his colleagues have elaborated on this idea in the 
utmost detail. In contrast, CT lacks any obvious device of capturing the systematic 
character of dead metaphors in everyday language.
(2) CMT maintains that the invariance principle governs the understanding of 
conventional as well as novel metaphors. Both kinds of metaphors can be under-
stood as a (kind of) mapping from the source domain to the target while preserving 
both their structures. For conventional metaphors this mechanism is static, for novel 
ones it is rather dynamic. CT uses a similar mechanism, but for novel metaphors 
only. CMT is a pioneer especially in the first point. Concerning novel metaphors, 
the difference between CMT and CT is merely terminological, i.e., verbal.
My final thoughts will be devoted to a problem concerning both CMT and many 
CTs. Lakoff (1993: 239 and 249) has highlighted several times that his approach be-
longs to that of synchronic linguistics. His main focus is on language and thinking, 
and their usage at a particular moment of time. His typical questions are: How a 
language user does understand this or that particular field of experience? Why our 
conceptual system structured this way and not that way? The answer is always: 
Because of this or that conceptual metaphor, i.e., because this (target) domain of 
experience is understood or structured along that (source) domain. The presence 
21 Bo Pettersson points out about cognitive literary criticism like CMT that it “at times 
displays a disregard of other literary theory and criticism, which may lead to thwart-
ed results or false claims of critical novelty” (2011: 94).
22 Lakoff, in an interview with Pires de Oliveira (2001: 39), disagrees with this point. 
All previous quotes that resemble CMT are too vague according to him. He does 
not “really see detailed cross-domain mappings that are experientially grounded in 
any earlier material”. See, however, Jäkel (1997) for an exhaustive overview of the 
predecessors of CMT. I would like to add that several philosophers (e.g., Kant or 
Nietzsche) focused on what we now call conceptual as well as novel metaphors, at 
times under different labels. Kant, for instance, provided no explicit theory of meta-
phor, but his concept of symbolic representation covers conventional metaphors and 
his concept of aesthetic idea can be used to explain novel metaphors. See my earlier 
paper, Mácha (2009), for details.
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of a conceptual metaphor is, thus, always an explanans. Conceptual metaphors are 
grounded in so-called primary metaphors whose source domain is our everyday 
experience (Lakoff and Johnson 2003: 254ff). The only explanation why there are 
specific primary metaphors is physical or, more specifically, neuroscientific; they 
are hard-wired in our brains and bodies.
Black’s Interaction Theory focused on metaphor from a similar perspective – the 
perspective of the language user. Black is interested in the problem of how a lan-
guage user produces and understands metaphors: with the help of the metaphorical 
meaning which is the result of an interaction of two complexes. But if we accept 
Davidson’s objection to his account, there is no metaphorical meaning communi-
cated. All that metaphors accomplish is that they make us see one subject as another 
subject. There are, however, many dormant (i.e., nearly dead) metaphors that, as 
matter of fact, have (nearly) a conventionalized meaning. How did they acquire 
this meaning and, in particular, is this meaning the result of the interaction of the 
two complexes?
A conceptual metaphor (dead/extinct/dormant metaphor for CT) is a former 
novel metaphor. At some point in time, someone applied the expression “neck” to 
bottles. It was a novel metaphor that was conventionalized eventually and resulted 
in the expression “bottleneck”. CT gives us a mechanism how to understand the 
expression “This bottle has a neck.” when it was a novel metaphor. CMT can inform 
us that the expression “bottleneck” is a realization of the conceptual metaphor 
PHYSICAL OBJECTS ARE HUMAN BODIES or the like. The most interesting ques-
tion is, however, how an original novel metaphor used to be transformed into a 
conceptual one. The question why there is this or that conceptual metaphor can be 
answered by providing its history, i.e., the way how this metaphor has developed 
into its present state.
Metaphors do have history. This claim is not surprising for languages in general 
have history. CMT, within its cog. sci. framework, as well as many CTs within ana-
lytic philosophy have been mainly preoccupied with the synchronic dimension of 
language, whereas they have neglected the diachronic one.23 This is not surprising 
for CMT owes much de Saussure’s structural linguistics, and CT goes back to logical 
positivism. Both schools tend to see language as an in-itself closed formal system 
which is (at least for the sake of our understanding) fixed and static. To borrow de 
23 Cf. Mitchell (2015: 25): “Taken together, critiques of CMT suggest that its rigid 
structure – though useful in analysing everyday, commonplace metaphors – fails 
to take into account a number of complexities, including the ‘history’ of metaphors 
[…].” Lakoff, when asked whether his methodology accounted for the historical 
dimensions of language, replied that this kind of research was done by his students 
and colleagues, “I just do not happen to do that research myself” (Pires de Oliveira 
2001: 29). I take the term “diachronic linguistics” to be roughly equal to “histori-
cal linguistics”. Cf. Harris (1993: 17): “Diachronic literally means across-time, and it 
describes any work which maps the shifts and fractures and mutations of languages 
over the centuries”. 
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Saussure’s analogy, language is like a game of chess. In order to understand chess, 
we do not need to study the history of chess, but its actual rules only. The pres-
ence of metaphors – novel as well as conceptual – indicates that language is, in 
an important respect, not like chess. If we want to understand the structure of our 
actual language, which is full of conceptual metaphors, we need to study how these 
metaphors have evolved from novel ones into their present form. What we need is to 
understand how metaphors catalyze semantic change. This approach entails that we 
have to abandon the perspective of an individual language user in favor of a wider 
perspective that spans a larger amount of time where semantic change is relevant. 
This is what I mean by a diachronic-driven account in the study of metaphor.
Wittgenstein’s later philosophy of language, esp. his notion of language game 
may provide a general framework for the diachronic approach which has been 
elaborated in Quine and more specifically in Davidson (1979). Also, continental 
philosophy is more prone to an historical analysis. Consider, for instance, the philo-
sophical attempts to backtrack the evolution of philosophical conceptual metaphors 
in José Ortega y Gasset’s (1925) “Las dos grandes metáforas” [“The Two Big Meta-
phors”], and especially in Hans Blumenberg’s (1960) metaphorology which very 
loosely elaborates upon Husserl’s phenomenological project.24 These accounts are 
however restricted to philosophical metaphors. We still lack any general theory 
that would be as robust as CMT.
There are some indications how a diachronic perspective can be accommodated 
into CMT. Kövecses (2005: 103–105) indicates by referring to empirical evidence 
that conceptual metaphors undergo change over time. His main assumption is that 
there “may be some universal basis for the same metaphors to develop in the di-
verse languages” (Kövecses 2015: 4). This universal basis is made up by some “uni-
versal bodily experience”, “universal embodiment” (Kövecses 2015: 5). The change 
in context (broadly understood, including culture) is the reason for a conceptual 
change or a variation. Kövecses’ perspective is, however, that of a single language 
user (a speaker or a recipient). Different users may have similar bodily experi-
ences (universality) and may be influenced by various contexts (variation, semantic 
change). Kövecses claims basically that semantic change is driven by changes in the 
non-linguistic context (i.e., by cultural changes), and less by changes of our bodily 
structure. This is not surprising. In my view, what is lacking in his approach is an 
explanation of the mechanism of this change and the role of metaphor in it. The 
main questions still remain unanswered: How a novel metaphorical expression 
acquires a conventional meaning and becomes a conceptual metaphor?
24 Cf. Jäkel (1997: 17): “As Cognitive Linguists and ‘metaphorologists’ doing primarily 
synchronic research we would certainly be well-advised to give more attention to 
the diachronic dimension in our analyses of metaphor than do Lakoff and Johnson. 
Especially in this regard, Blumenberg’s approach could provide a model for the 
methodology of the cognitive theory of metaphor”. 
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Relevance Theory, which is another major contemporary response to the classical 
accounts of metaphor, provides (better to say: points towards) an account for the 
fixation or stabilization of the meaning of a novel metaphorical expression. To be 
sure, Relevance Theory is a predominantly synchronic approach drawing on Gricean 
pragmatics (Sperber and Wilson 2008: 87), because their perspective is a single act 
of linguistic communication. In the course of this act, the addressee tries to encode 
the speaker’s intended meaning by adjusting lexical meanings “in order to satisfy 
expectations of relevance” (Wilson 2011: 47). Relevance is, roughly, defined as the 
cognitive value of an utterance (and other stimuli) in proportion to the processing 
effort required to achieve this cognitive value.25 An adjustment of lexical meanings 
involves sometimes the construction of so-called “ad hoc” concepts (typically by 
the narrowing or broadening of the encoded lexical meaning). Ad hoc concepts 
inherit some (but not all) properties of the linguistically encoded meanings. It is 
important that these concepts are typically occasion-specific (Wilson 2011: 43). Given 
this general scenario, relevance theories claim that metaphorical communication is 
a case of the construction of ad hoc concepts. So, for instance, if one utters about 
a woman “You are a rose.”, the addressee is invited to construct an ad hoc concept 
of ROSE* in order to maximize the relevance of the utterance. ROSE* may express, 
among other things, the property of being beautiful or the property of being thorny 
depending on the context of the utterance.26
The mechanism of constructing ad hoc concepts is, roughly, compatible to the 
CMT’s method of the construction of one-shot mappings as described above. This 
is the synchronic part of Relevance Theory’s approach. But the construction of an 
ad hoc concept “may be regularly and frequently followed, by a few people or a 
group, until, over time, the resulting ‘ad hoc’ concept may stabilise in a community 
and give rise to an extra lexicalised sense” (Wilson 2011: 52). This is a genuinely 
diachronic approach, because the perspective of a single act of linguistic commu-
nication is abandoned in favor of the perspective of “a group” and “over time”. A 
new lexicalized meaning arises through the repeated constructing of the same ad 
hoc concept, because the amount of processing effort needed to understand the 
utterance is reduced when a meaning is lexicalized. In other words, a metaphorical 
expression acquires a lexicalized meaning through repeated interpretations.27 This 
25 What exactly this cognitive value is remains unclear. Similarly to CMT, Relevance 
Theory uses the terminology of cognitive science, although to a significantly lesser 
degree. A proper critical assessment of Relevance Theory is out of the scope of the 
present essay.
26 CMT would say that this metaphorical utterance is an instance of the conceptual 
metaphor WOMEN ARE FLOWERS (See Wilson 2011: 43). The explanation given 
by Relevance Theory is clearly superior to the one given by CMT – provided that 
there will be an adequate explanation of the notion of relevance. See the previous 
footnote.
27 An advocate of CMT might argue that a similar mechanism of meaning fixation and 
stabilization can be brought forward within CMT: A conventional cross-domain 
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is, however, a very general characterization of semantic change. How this is exactly 
achieved still remains unclear.28,29
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